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I.  SUMMARY
Contracts between the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers  (ICANN)  and  domain  name  registries  and  registrars
give  ICANN  the  right  to  impose  domain  name  policies  on  those
registries and registrars (and thereby  on the wider user community),
but only where those  policies  have been  the subject of documented
consensus.'  The "consensus  policy"  theory  is  central  to  ICANN's
legitimacy and was the product of intense negotiation  at the time of
ICANN's  founding.2  In  October  2002,  in  Shanghai,  China,  the
ICANN Board  approved  new bylaws that  allow  the Board to adopt
domain  name  policies  by  a  vote  of the  Board,  irrespective  of the
presence  or  absence  of  consensus  among  any  of  the  various
stakeholders.  These  new bylaws represent  an  intentional departure
from  the  consensus  decision-making  model,  and  a  move  towards
centralized, top-down policy-making.
We believe  that abandoning  consensus  as the basis for ICANN
policy-making  is neither  in ICANN's  best interests nor in the  best
interests of the Internet  community.  It will substantially undermine
ICANN's  authority, as it eliminates the only answer that now exists
•  Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School (2002-2003).
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1. See Registrar Accreditation Agreement,  pt. II.D.l.b.i  (Nov. 9, 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htrn.
2.  See  ICANN  Background  (Nov.  4,  1999),  at  http://www.icann.org/
general/background.htm#7.
3. See Preliminary  Report:  ICANN Meeting in  Shanghai  (Oct. 31,  2002),
at http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-3  I  oct02.htm.
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to  the question  that  more  and more people  will  ask:  "What  gives
ICANN the right to tell anyone what to do?"
II.  BACKGROUND
In  late  September  1999,  a  web  of  contracts  was  announced
between  and  among  Network  Solutions,  Inc.  (NSI),  the  year-old
ICANN,  and the U.S.  Department  of Commerce.4  NSI was,  at the
time,  the  sole registry  and  the  sole registrar  for  the ".com,"  ".net,"
and ".org"  top-level  domains (TLDs). 5  ICANN  and the Department
of  Commerce  made  it  clear  that  NSI's  monopoly  on  registrar
functions  was going to  end; ICANN was proceeding with its plan to
open  up  the  registrar  function  to  competitors  who  would  have  the
ability to  sell  second-level domains  (like "ibm.com")  in these  TLDs
and to register those second-level domains on their customers'  behalf
in the central registry.6  In the contract, ICANN and the Department
of Commerce  agreed  to  allow  NSI to  continue  to  operate  the  top-
level registries in these domains, and to charge registrars  a fee of up
to six dollars per name  for the  registration  of second-level  domains
within those registries.
7
NSI,  in  turn, agreed  to  submit  to  ICANN's  authority  over  its
8 activities.  More  specifically, NSI  agreed to  comply with ICANN's
then-current  domain name policies,  as well as with ICANN's future
policies  relating  to  "issues  for  which  uniform  or  coordinated
resolution  is  reasonably  necessary  to  facilitate  interoperability,
technical  reliability  and/or  stable  operation  of  the  Internet  or
4.  See  Approved  Agreements  among  ICANN,  the  U.S.  Department  of
Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc. (Nov.  10,  1999), at http://www.icann.
org/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm;  Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra  note 1.
5.  See  ICANN,  REGISTRAR  ACCREDITATION:  HISTORY  OF  THE  SRS
[hereinafter  ICANN,  REGISTRAR  ACCREDITATION],  at  http://www.icann.org/
registrars/accreditation-history.htm  (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
6.  See  id.; Management  of Internet  Names  and Addresses,  63  Fed.  Reg.
31,741  (June  10,  1998) (statement of policy).
7.  See ICANN,  REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION,  supra note  5; see also NSI-
Registrar License Agreement  § 5.2(b) (Nov. 9,  1999), at http://www.icann.org/
nsi/nsi-rla-04nov99.htm.
8.  See Amendment  19  to Cooperative  Agreement  Between NSI  and U.S.
Government  (Nov. 8, 1999),  at http://www.icann.org/nsi/coopagmt-amendl9-
04nov99.htm  (stating,  "[a]mendment  19  solidifies  those  arrangements  and
provides  that  in  operating  the registry  NSI  will abide  by  consensus  policies
adopted in the ICANN process.").
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domain-name  system." 9   There  was,  however,  a  proviso:  only
policies  that  were  the  result  of consensus,  as  documented  by  a
written report  showing  (a) the  extent  of agreement  among  affected
groups,  (b) the outreach process  used to obtain the views of groups
likely  to  be  affected,  and  (c)  the  nature  and  intensity  of reasoned
support  and  opposition  to  the  proposed  policy-and  that  were
recommended  by  at  least  a  two-thirds  vote  of the  council  of the
ICANN  Supporting  Organization  addressing  the  issue-would  be
binding on NSI in the future.10  In addition, the contract provided that
in  the  event  of a  disagreement  about  the  existence  vel  non  of a
consensus on any such future policy, the issue would be reviewed by
an  Independent  Review  Panel  (IRP)  to  be  established  under
ICANN's bylaws. "
These  provisions  became  standard  in  ICANN's  contracts  with
all of the  gTLD (non-country  code)  registrars  and registries.'2  The
basic notion behind the consensus  policy regime is that registry  and
registrar businesses have  agreed to  comply with future policies  that
do  not  exist  at  the  time  they  sign  their  contracts,  mandating  or
prohibiting particular  actions  by these  businesses.  But parties must
only  comply  with  policies  that  are  actually  the  product  of  a
documented  outreach  process  and  enjoy  documented  support  by
9. ICANN-NSI Registry Agreement,  Agreements  pt. 3(A)(ii)(b)  (Nov. 10,
1999), at http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm.
10.  See  id. at Definitions  pt.  1.  During the  first  four  years  of ICANN's
existence,  ICANN's  Supporting Organizations  were each focused on different
parts  of  ICANN's  mandate:  addressing  through  the  Address  Supporting
Organization;  assigning domain  names through  the Domain Name  Supporting
Organization;  and  assigning  protocols  through  the  Protocol  Support
Organization.  Almost all of the energy and controversy  in the ICANN context
during  these  four  years  took  place  in  the  Domain  Name  Supporting
Organization.  Within the Domain Name  Supporting Organization,  there were
still  more  groups-various  constituencies  established  in  ICANN's  bylaws
(registries  for generic  names (gTLDs), registrars,  intellectual property  groups,
business, registries  for country code  names  (ccTLDs),  and  a  Names  Council
made  up  of delegates  from  these  constituencies.)  The Names  Council's job
was to facilitate  and encourage  the work of documenting  "consensus"  among
affected constituencies or parties concerning new mandatory policies.
11.  See  Registrar  Accreditation  Agreement,  supra note  1, pt.  I.B.2.  For
complicated reasons, the IRP has never been formed.
12.  See  id. pt.  I.B.1-3  (paralleling  the  provisions  of the  ICANN-NSI
Registry Agreement).
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parties that are substantially affected by the policy.' 3  In the absence
of a consensus policy to the contrary, a registry or registrar is free to
innovate and run its business as it sees fit.
The  premise of the  consensus  policy regime  should  have  been
easy to understand:  if most of those  affected by a rule agree that it
will  improve  things,  and  intense  opposition  is  absent,  irrational,
limited to  those who do not bear  the costs of the policy in question,
or  limited to  those  whose  objection  is  based  solely  on a  desire to
continue to engage in unjustifiable  wrongdoing, then those who have
to  implement the  rule agree,  by  contract, to  do  so.  This consensus
regime was designed to produce very few global rules for the naming
system.  The  idea  was  that  everything  not  subject  to  a  global
consensus policy would be subject to "local"  control-control by the
registry  itself, which  would  be  subject  to  local  law  enforcement.
Only those policies that most affected parties agreed were needed to
assure  interoperability  and  stability  of the  Domain  Name  System
(DNS) would be implemented in a global fashion.
Even  before  the  1999  web  of contracts  was  implemented,  the
ICANN  community  had  an  example  of how  the  consensus  policy
process  could  work.  The  Uniform  Dispute  Resolution  Policy
(UDRP), for which  implementation  documents  were adopted  in late
October  1999,  is  the  closest thing that  ICANN  has  to  a  consensus
policy.14  The report that accompanied the proposed UDRP reflected
an  extensive  series  of  discussions  among  those  affected  by  the
proposal,  documented  arguments  for  and against  the  proposal,  and
provided  related  background  information.'  The  decision  of the
Board  to  adopt  the  UDRP  was  based  on  the  fact  that  intense
discussions  among  strong  proponents  of differing  viewpoints  had
yielded  a  document  that  was  not  vigorously  opposed  by  any
substantially  affected  party.16  It  is  true  that  both  substantive  and
13.  See id.  pt. I.B. 1.
14.  See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra  note  1, part I.B.5.
15.  See  Second  Staff  Report  on  Implementation  Documents  for  the
Uniform  Dispute  Resolution  Policy  (Oct.  25,  1999),  at  www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct1999.htm;  Draft  Policy  Prepared  by
ICANN  Staff and Counsel and Posted  for Public Review and Comment (Sept.
29,  1999), at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-29Sept1999.htm.
16.  See  Minutes  of  Special  Meeting,  (Oct.  24,  1999),  at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-24oct99.htm.
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procedural mistakes were made with respect to the resulting policy.' 7
But the UDRP was not adopted until there was a widely shared view
that going forward with the proposal was better than not having any
standardized  policy on the issue.' 8
Since  1999, however,  no consensus  policies  have  been  created
or  adopted  by  ICANN.  There  are  several  reasons  for  this
phenomenon.  First,  ICANN  staff,  who  played  a  crucial  role  in
facilitating  the  deal-making  and  consensus-building  that  led to  the
adoption  of the  UDRP,  have  not  publicly  exerted  leadership  in
calling  for  the  creation  of  consensus  policies  and  running  the
process.  ICANN  staff and  management  have  had  deep  concerns
about the consensus process from the beginning,  because they worry
that holdouts will make the development  of consensus  impossible.' 9
They  also worry  that ICANN's credibility  and  ability to make both
global  and effective rules will be undermined by this process, which
involves  documentation  of  outreach  and  other  time-consuming
efforts.20
Second,  the  development  and  structure  of  the  constituency
system within  the  Domain  Name  Supporting  Organization  and  the
work of the Names  Council block any work towards true community
consensus  along  the  lines  followed  by  those  who  worked  on  the
UDRP.  Each  constituency  views  itself  as  a  group  of
"representatives"  who  work to further  the  perceived  goals  of their
constituents.  At  the  same  time,  the  Names  Council,  which  was
supposed to facilitate the development  of consensus, views itself as a
legislature.  This "legislature" view has had the effect of filtering and
distorting  events,  producing  a  flurry  of seat-claiming  and  report-
controlling  but very  little  substantive  work.  The  consensus  report
17.  See  Michael  Geist, Fair.com?: An  Examination of the Allegations of
Systemic  Unfairness  in  the  ICANN  UDRP  (Aug.  2001),  at
http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/frameset.html  (criticizing  UDRP);  see  also
Internet  Democracy  Project,  Answers  from  Andy  Mueller-Maguhn  to  IDP
Questionnaire  at  http://www.intemetdemocracyproj ect.org/IDPanswers
mueller.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
18.  See Geist, supra note  17.
19.  See  Committee  on  ICANN Evolution  and Reform,  Working  Paper  on
the Policy-Development  Process,  pt.  .A (May  7,  2002)  [hereinafter  Working
Paper  on  the  Policy-Development  Process],  at  http://www.icann.org/
committees/evol-reform/working-paper-process-07mayO2.htm.
20.  See id.  pt. I.B.
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structure  set  forth  in  the  registry/registrar  contracts,  with  its
requirements  of analysis  and outreach, should have encouraged  staff
and  working  groups  to  see  themselves  as  the  community's  staff
rather  than  as  a  group  of  self-appointed  representatives.
Unfortunately, that has not happened.
In  February  2002,  M.  Stuart  Lynn,  ICANN's  President,
announced  that  ICANN  was  broken  and  would  have  to  be  fixed
before  it could continue  its coordination  work.21  Lynn proposed to
reform  ICANN  by increasing  the staff by fifty percent  (going from
twenty to thirty) and substantially  increasing ICANN's budget.22  He
also wanted to change ICANN's organizational  structure by revising
its  Supporting  Organizations  and  reducing  the  number  of Board
members-and  by  dropping  the  effort  to  elect  at-large  Board
members  from  the  Internet  community.23  Instead,  he  proposed  to
add  five  representatives  from  governments  to  represent  the  public
interest.24  Finally,  he  proposed  that  the  ICANN  Board  should  be
able to create  global rules on its own that would mandate particular
actions  by  existing  registries  and  registrars  under  contract  with
ICANN-and  thus, to eliminate  the  consensus  requirement.2 5  This
Article focuses on this last proposal.
ICANN's  Board  formed  an  Evolution  and  Reform  Committee
(ERC)  that  published  several  drafts  of a  "Blueprint"  for  the  new
ICANN during the summer of 2002.26  This work formed the basis of
the new bylaws  that were  adopted  in October  2002  in Shanghai  by
the ICANN Board.27  As of the  date of this Article,  ICANN has not
announced  how  it  intends  to  deal  with  the  existing  registry  and
registrar  contracts.  Currently,  these  contracts  require  documented
consensus as a condition for imposing a mandatory policy on registry
21.  See M. STUART LYNN,  PRESIDENT'S REPORT:  ICANN-THE  CASE FOR
REFORM  (Feb.  24,  2002),  at  http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-
proposal-24feb02-htm.
22.  See id. (proposing-in part three  under the heading  "Why  the  Current
Course Won't Work"-a budget increase of 300-500% to fully fund ICANN).
23.  See id.
24.  See id.
25.  See id. Although how that could be done without amending the registry
and registrar contracts was not discussed.
26.  See Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform,  ICANN: A Blueprint
for Reform  (June 20,  2002)  [hereinafter ICANN:  A Blueprint for Reform],  at
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20junO2.htm.
27.  Preliminary Report ICANN Meeting in Shanghai, supra note 3.
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and registrar businesses.28  What will  happen when ICANN tries to
impose on  a registry  a new policy  that  has not been the  subject  of
documented consensus?
III.  WHY CARE ABOUT CONSENSUS?
Although the consensus  policy regime has been in place  within
ICANN  for  four years,  many people who  follow ICANN  issues do
not understand,  and are impatient with, the idea of consensus. 29  But
consensus  provides  a concrete  answer  to  the  question  "Who  gave
ICANN  the right to tell me what to  do?"  In a sense, the consensus
policy  theory  provides  a  real  "social  contract"  and  contractually
binding  "consent  of the  governed."  The ICANN  consensus  theory
asks each potential  participant  whether they will agree contractually
to implement  and abide by a future rule, sight unseen, provided that
most people support it and that those parties substantially affected by
the policy  either  do  not  vigorously  oppose  it,  or their  objection  is
unreasonable.
This  contract  supports  ICANN's  legitimacy,  and  helps  in
understanding  ICANN, because it provides a demonstration that each
participant  in  the  ICANN  regime  has  affirmatively  agreed  to
ICANN's jurisdiction.  However, ICANN's jurisdiction  is limited to
the  purpose  of  making  global  rules  with  which  most  affected
participants agree to go along.  It is intentionally designed to produce
only those rules that most people agree  should  be global-and very
few  rules  will  fall  into  this  category.  Everything  that  is  not  the
subject of a global consensus agreement will be left to local decision-
making.  The consensus policy theory provides subjective  balancing
between  necessary  global  rules  and  local  rules  that  no  amount  of
expertise can pretend to provide.
Rather than eliminate the requirement that mandatory policies be
supported  by  documented  consensus,  ICANN  should  more
effectively implement the consensus theory through increased Board
and  staff participation  in  the consensus  development  process.  The
consensus  process  cannot work  without  strong  leadership.  And,  if
consensus  of most of those substantially affected by a particular rule
28.  See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra note 1, pt. I.
29.  See Working Paper on the Policy-Development  Process, supra note  19,
pt. I.B. 1.
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does  not  exist,  the  default  setting  should  be  local  policies-rather
than a top-down Board vote  to create a new global policy.  Because
ICANN  can never be a global democracy and has no  delegated rule-
making  authority  from  the  U.S.  government,  or  any  other
government, it needs another basis for legitimacy.
We have  structured this Article as a commentary  on the text  of
the  Blueprint  that  was  published  by  the  Board's  ERC  during  the
summer of 2002.  We suggest a different route than the one that was
ultimately  adopted  by  the Board in Shanghai.  We  think the Board
should have upheld the  key role of consensus as  a limitation on its
authority to promulgate mandatory policies.
IV.  ERC BLUEPRINT  AND COMMENTARY
A.  Policy Responsibility of the ICANN Board
The  Board  of Directors  is  ICANN's  ultimate  decision-making
body.  It  and  it  alone  has the  legal  responsibility  to  make  and  be
legally accountable  for all policy and other decisions. It is ultimately
responsible  for the management  of the policy development  process.
Therefore,  while it is highly desirable to seek and wherever possible
find  consensus,  it  does  not  follow  that  even  proposals  that  enjoy
consensus  support  should  receive  uncritical  Board  approval.  The
Board has a fiduciary responsibility to make decisions on the basis of
good faith judgment in furthering the public interest.30
In this regard, the ERC is stating that the Board can and should,
acting  alone,  have  the  ability  to  make  all  "policy  and  other"
decisions. 31  The  ERC  has  presented  its  concern  as:  Right  now,
every  decision the  Board makes  has to  be  supported  by  consensus.
This  is  an  untenable  situation.  We  cannot  be  effective  in  this
context.  We  need  reform  to  make  these  decisions  on  our  own
without waiting for consensus.32
We think  it  is  important  to  understand  that  the  Board  makes
several  different  kinds  of decisions.  Only a  small  subset  of these
decisions-those  dealing  with  mandatory  policies  that  flow  down
through  registry  and  registrar  contracts-need  to  be  supported  by
30.  See ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform, supra note 26, § 4.
31.  See id.
32.  See Working Paper on the Policy-Development Process, supra  note  19.
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documented  consensus.  Documented  consensus  is  required  only
when  the  rule  adopted  mandates  or  prohibits  particular  actions  by
registries  and  registrars  with  whom  ICANN  has  contracts
incorporating the consensus policy process.
There are, in general,  four types of Board policy decisions:  (1)
administrative,  (2)  amendments  to  existing  contracts  (or  approvals
under existing contracts),  (3) emergency,  and (4) mandatory  policies
that are binding on registries or registrars.33
1. The Board can act administratively without consensus
When  the  Board  needs  to  hire  staff, allocate  tasks,  create  a
committee  of  experts,  or  rent  new  space,  it  can  do  so  without
anyone's consensus.
34
2. The Board can amend its contracts with registries, registrars, and
others (or approve actions under these contracts) without consensus
When,  for  one  reason  or  another,  provisions  of contracts  that
ICANN  has  entered  into  are  amended by the  mutual  agreement  of
ICANN and the other contracting  party, only the Board can authorize
such amendments  on behalf of ICANN.  Similarly, approvals  called
for  in ICANN's  contracts must  be endorsed  by the  Board  applying
criteria implicit in the intent underlying  those contracts.  In a sense,
the Board is  the only voice  ICANN  has.  The Board  can authorize
amendments  to  these  contracts,  amendments  that  are  voluntary  on
both sides, or give approvals  within parameters and for purposes  set
forth in the contracts,  without consensus.  Of course, the  Board can
ask  anyone  it  likes  for  advice  on  the  subject  of  contractual
amendments and approvals.
3. The Board can act in an emergency without consensus
Importantly,  the  Board  can  always  adopt  a  temporary
specification  or policy  mandating  (or prohibiting)  particular  action
by  registries  or  registrars  in an  emergency.  This  is  found  in the
power to act when "the Board reasonably  determines that immediate
temporary establishment of a specification or policy on the subject is
necessary  to maintain the operational  stability of Registrar  Services,
33.  See ICANN:  A Blueprint for Reform, supra note 26,  § 4.
34.  See id.
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the  DNS,  or  the  Internet." 35   Even  in the  absence  of documented
consensus,  such  temporary  policies  can  be  treated  as  consensus
policies  for up  to  a year  while  the  real  consensus  process  runs  its
course.
4. But the Board cannot, in the absence of an emergency, adopt a
mandatory policy that is binding on a registry or registrar without
documented consensus
Under  the current  contracts  ICANN  has  signed,  when ICANN
seeks  to  impose  a policy  on  a  registry  or  registrar  with  which  it
already  has  a  contract,  such  policies  must  be  the  result  of
consensus.
36
There  is  a very  specific  process  set  forth in those  contracts:  a
consensus  must be demonstrated by a written report documenting (a)
the  extent  of agreement  among  impacted  groups,  (b)  the  outreach
process  used to obtain the views of groups likely to be affected,  and
(c)  the nature and intensity of reasoned support and opposition to the
proposed policy-and must be recommended  by at least a two-thirds
vote  of  the  council  of  the  ICANN  Supporting  Organization
addressing the issue.37
When ICANN adopts policies that registries (or registrars) must
follow,  those  policies  are  only  binding  when  a  documented
consensus  exists and when an IRP is available to review the Board's
determination  that  this  is  so. 38  When  the  Board  makes  decisions
about how many  staff to pay  for, or how many TLDs to open  up, or
how  to  make  decisions  required  directly  by  its  contracts,  it  can
simply  do  that without  documented  consensus.39  Additionally,  the
Board  is  directly  entitled  to  adopt  some  binding  policies  in
emergency  circumstances  when  the  stability  of  the  DNS  is
threatened. 4 0   But ICANN's  contracts  with  gTLDs  and  sponsored
top-level  domains  (sTLD)  registries,  and  with  its  accredited
registrars,  currently  obligate  the  contracting  parties to  follow  future
35.  Registrar  Accreditation  Agreement  §  4.3.4  (May  17,  2001),  at
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-  17may01 .htm.
36.  See id.  § 4.1.1.
37.  See id.§ 4.3.1.
38.  See id. §§  4.3.2, 4.3.6.
39.  See  id. §§  4.1.1,  4.1.2,  4.3.4,  4.4  (limiting  the  circumstances  under
which registrars must comply).
40.  See id. § 4.3.4.
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policies only when they are supported by both appropriate votes and
by  documentation  that  demonstrates  the  existence  of  consensus
among affected parties.
41
We  believe  that the most effective  ICANN  reform would have
been based  on and  implemented  through  the  existing contracts  that
registries  and registrars  have signed.  The Board  should continue  to
make  future  policies  binding  in  accordance  with  the  consensus
process  as  outlined  in  those  documents.  A  claimed  need  for
consensus  should not be  allowed to hold up Board action  on matters
that do  not  require the  imposition  of mandatory  future  policies  on
contracting parties.
The  Blueprint  uses  the  word  "policy"  in  two  very  different
ways,  and  the  usage  of  this  word  should  be  clarified  to  avoid
confusion.  While the Board  is ultimately  responsible  for all  policy
decisions,  its  ability  to  enforce  policies  that  mandate  particular
actions (or prohibit particular  actions) by  registries and  registrars  is
dependent  on the terms of the  contracts  that  ICANN  has  entered.
Accordingly,  ICANN's  Board  should  distinguish  between  those
decisions  that  are  either  administrative  or  that  merely  set  policy
regarding future  ICANN  actions and those  that create  an obligation
on the part of contracting parties to follow such policies.
In  determining  whether  a  consensus  exists,  the  Board  is  not
required to find  that there are  no opposing voices.  Dissent may be
overridden  when  it  is  irrational  or  comes  from  parties  not
substantially  affected  by  a  proposed  policy.  Dissent  may  also  be
overridden  if it  comes  from  those  whose  objection  stems  from  a
desire  to  continue  activities  that  are  "wrongful"  because  they
interfere with orderly  markets  or unjustifiably  impose harm on third
parties.
ICANN's  consensus  process  is  broken  because,  among  other
things, stakeholders  lack adequate  incentives  to  come to the  policy
development  table  prepared  to  make  a  deal.  It  is  clear  that  an
important implementation  step should have been the establishment of
clearer  guidelines  for  the  Board's  management  of  the  consensus
development  process  (including  deadlines  and  clear  allocation  of
41.  See id. §§  4.1, 4.1.1  (stating that "[d]uring the Term of this Agreement,
Registrar  shall  comply  with  the terms  of this Agreement  on  the schedule  set
forth in Subsection 4.4, with...  new or revised specifications...  and policies
established by ICANN as Consensus Policies .... ").
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responsibility),  exercise  of its  role  in determining  the  existence  of
consensus, and clear recognition of the Board's ability to take actions
that do not require consensus because they do not impose mandatory
rules on contracting parties.  The Board should not have acted to free
itself completely from the strictures of the consensus policy concept.
B.  Policy and Consensus Defined
"Policy"  is a  term that does not apply  to  every action  that
ICANN  takes, through  its  Board or otherwise.  To  qualify
as a policy decision,  a matter brought  before the Board for
Board  action  should  exhibit  some  or  all  of the  following
characteristics:
" It  should  be broadly  applicable  to multiple  situations  or
organizations  (that is, not apply  to just  a single one-off
situation);
* It  should  be  expected  to  have  lasting  value  or
applicability, albeit with occasional updates;
* It  should  establish  a  guide  or  framework  for  future
decision-making.
42
We think that the ERC got it wrong with respect to what policy
means,  and  created  a  great  deal  of confusion  with  respect  to  this
issue.  Policies  may  come  in various  forms.  Some  policies  may
provide a framework for future decision-making but may not require
compliance  by  contracting  registries  and  registrars.  Some  policies
may represent the kinds of "consensus  policies" for which ICANN's
existing  contracts  explicitly  require  registries  and  registrars  to
comply.  Any proposed  policy should be  explicitly  identified  at the
outset  as  falling  within one  or  another  of these  categories,  as  the
procedures and documentation differ for different kinds of policies.
Many, if not most, decisions made by the Board do not fit within
this  meaning  of  a  policy  decision.  They  may,  for  example,  be
decisions regarding a single one-off situation that has no foreseeable
future applicability,  or they may be administrative  decisions.  To the
extent possible, however, other decisions made by ICANN should be
made within the framework of already developed policies.  Certainly,
specific  decisions may stimulate the need to develop broad policies.43
42.  ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform, supra  note 26, § 4.
43.  See id.
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As  set forth above, many, if not most, of the Board's  decisions
need not be based on a documented  consensus.  We agree that there
should  be  a clear  mechanism  for  the Board  or  any  constituency  to
propose  any kind of policy.  This mechanism  should be effective  for
either consensus or another sort of policy.
Policy  development  through  bottom-up  consensus
processes  should  be  encouraged.  To  be  presumptively
binding,  any  policy  developed  must  reflect  a  true
consensus, that is, a policy acceptable to the great majority
of those  affected, with no  strong  and  reasoned  opposition.
Any such policy recommended to the ICANN Board, if not
acceptable  to the  Board,  should be  returned  to  the  policy
development  body  with  a  clear  statement  of the  Board's
concerns.  If and when  such a recommendation  is returned
to  the Board  as  a true  consensus  policy  recommendation,
the  Board  may  reject  or  modify  such  a  recommendation
only by a 2/3  vote.  In the absence  of true consensus being
achievable,  the  Board  will  act  according  to  its  own  best
judgment accounting  for community principles,  needs,  and
desires as best it can interpret them.
44
There  are  several  problems  with this  paragraph.  First,  "to  be
presumptively binding,"  a consensus policy must come from below,
instead of being  created  by the Board.  Second,  the  description  of
reasons  that  would justify  derailing  a  consensus  policy  should  be
made  clear  and  should  not  include  "wrongful"  action.  Third,  the
Board  should  not  presume  that  it  has  the  endorsement  of  the
worldwide  public  in  applying  its  "own  best judgment."  No  one
could  presume  to  speak  on behalf of the  global  Internet.  We  find
breathtaking  the ERC's  assertion that  the Board could  act to create
binding  policies  based  solely  on its  own "judgment."  We  believe
this paragraph should have been revised to read:
Policy  development  through  bottom-up  consensus
processes  should  be  encouraged.  To  be  presumptively
binding,  any  policy  developed  must  reflect  a  true
consensus, that is, a policy acceptable  to the great majority
of those  affected, with no  strong  and reasoned  opposition
or with opposition only from those who seek to continue or
44.  Id.
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commence activities that harm the competitive marketplace
or  impose  unjustifiable  costs  on  third  parties.  Any  such
policy  recommended  to  the  ICANN  Board,  if  not
acceptable  to the  Board,  should  be  returned  to  the policy
development  body  with  a  clear  statement  of the  Board's
concerns.  If and when  such a recommendation  is returned
to  the  Board  as  a true consensus  policy recommendation,
the  Board  may  reject  ...  edify-such  a  recommendation
only by  a  2/3  vote.  In  the  absence  of true  consensus  as
defined  above  being  achievable,  the  Board  wi4  may  act
aeaefdi.  in  exigent  circumstances  to  its  e;i  bes +
judgmet a cu.t.ing fer community priniples,  needs,  and
desires as best it  an interpret them preserve interoperabilitv
or the stable operation of the Internet.4 5
The  revised  paragraph  makes  clear that the  Board may  modify
proposed  binding  consensus  policies  only  if  the  modifications
themselves meet these consensus  criteria (i.e.,  only when the Board
can document that objections  to the modification  are not "strong  and
reasoned,"  do not come from substantially affected  parties, or come
only from those engaged in "unjustifiable  wrongdoing.")
Of  course,  the  Board  may  act  "according  to  its  own  best
judgment"  in  all  other  matters  that  do  not  involve  enforcing  a
decision  against  potentially  unwilling  contracting  parties  absent
consensus  as  defined  by  the  contracts  and  as  clarified  by  this
additional  interpretive language.
In  contrast,  any  recommendations  made  by  ICANN's  policy
development  bodies  on  matters  other  than policy  as defined  above
should  have  only  whatever  persuasive  merit  is  inherent  in  the
recommendation.
C. Process
A  bottom-up,  consensus-driven  approach  to  policy
development is preferable wherever such approaches do not
prevent  the  Board  from  carrying  out  it's  [sic]  ultimate
responsibility  for  ensuring  policies  are  developed,
approved,  and  implemented  as  necessary  to  accomplish
ICANN's  mission.  That  is,  wherever  practical,  the
45.  Id. (alterations added).
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development or modification of policies would benefit from
undergoing  policy  development  in the  appropriate  policy
development  body  acting  with  appropriate  community
review and input.
New policy development or revisions  to existing policies
(collectively called  "policy development")  may be initiated
by  the  Board  or  by  the  appropriate  policy  development
body.  Any policy development  process, particularly when
initiated  by the  Board, should  have most of the  following
characteristics:
*  A  clear  assignment  to  the  appropriate  policy
development body.  If more than one such body has an
appropriate  interest,  one  body  shall  be  assigned  the
lead responsibility for coordinating with the others;
"  A  defined  timescale  for  completing  the  policy
development  leading  to  a  recommendation  to  the
Board, normally in the range of 60 days or less;
"  A predefined  process  and timescale  for collecting  and
evaluating community and public input;
"  A recommendation  to the Board that reflects the inputs
received and corresponding reasons for the presence or
absence  of true  consensus;  the  pros and  cons  of any
recommendation;  and  summaries  of  supporters  and
opponents;
"  An opportunity  for the  Board  to  receive  advice  from
other  bodies  including  Expert  Advisory  Panels  or
bodies...  and the GAC;
"  A  requirement  that  where  practicable  the  Board
publish a tentative  decision that allows for a period  of
public  comment  and  review  by  the  assigned  policy
development body prior to making a final decision.
These general principles  must be adapted by the Board to
different circumstances.  Emergency circumstances  may be
addressed  by  implementing  temporary  policies  to  be
modified if necessary  in follow-up work.  The key elements
are  that  in  every  situation there  be  a policy  development
plan  including  a  timescale  for  completion,  a  process  for
receiving public  input and  other  advice, and  a  process  for
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seeking  consensus  where possible.  To  the  extent  feasible
these plans should be developed  before initiating the policy
development process.
46
The  Blueprint's  all-purpose  use  of the  word  "policy"  should
have  been  amplified  and  clarified  as  part  of this  implementation
process,  so  that  clear  lines  would  have  been  drawn  between  the
various kinds of policies the ICANN Board could create.47
As  indicated  elsewhere,  staff support  must be  provided  to the
policy development groups to ensure they can perform  their work in
a timely manner.48
We agree that both the Board and ICANN staff may and should
actively  participate  in  the  consensus  development  process.  The
consensus  process  cannot work without  strong leadership,  and there
is no requirement  that the Board or the staff be neutral about policy
outcomes.  Instead,  the  key  requirement  for  Board  and  staff
involvement  is  that  they  provide  adequate  opportunities  for
participation  and  accurately  report  the  existence  or  lack  of  true
consensus.
None of the above is intended to inhibit the Board from making
policy decisions  as  appropriate  in the  absence  of the  ability  of the
community to reach consensus.
49
As  noted  above,  the  limited exception  to this statement  is  that
the  ability  of the  Board  to  enforce  policies  that  direct  contracting
parties to do something or not to do something will, of course, turn
on the  contractual  requirement  of documented  consensus.  Again,
many, if not most, Board actions will not fall into this category.
Ultimately,  the  Board's  legitimacy  and  effectiveness  in
enforcing its policies stem from the fact that parties contracting with
ICANN  have  voluntarily  agreed  to  abide  by  future  policies  under
certain circumstances.  No  registry  or registrar may  irrationally,  or
for  rational  reasons  based  on  a  desire  to  continue  or  commence
activities  that  harm  the  competitive  marketplace  or  impose
46.  Id.
47.  The  policies  the  ICANN  Board  can  adopt  are:  administrative,
implementation of existing contractual  agreements,  emergency,  and consensus
policies  binding  on  registries  and  registrars.  See  supra  note  35  and
accompanying text.
48.  See id.
49.  See id.
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unjustifiable harms  on third parties  simply veto the judgment of the
community reflected in a documented consensus process.
As part of the transition process,  a task force  composed  of
representatives  from  the  broad  ICANN community  should
be  established  to  recommend  a  specific  set  of  policy
development  procedures  and  timetables.  The  task  force
should complete its work before August 31,  2002, so that its
recommendations  can  be  posted  for public  comment  prior
to ICANN's meeting in Shanghai. °
We  believe  that the Board  should have  set  specific time frames  for
responses  by  constituencies  and  Supporting  Organization's  (SO)  to
proposed consensus  policies, instead of reserving for itself the ability
to modify these policies or adopting by vote their own "mandatory"
policies.  Here is  a set of guidelines  that would facilitate  consensus
policy development:
1.  The Board  calls  for work  on a particular  consensus  policy
(either on its own or when requested to do so).  Any refusal or failure
by the Board to respond to a request for a consensus policy should be
subject to review.  The Board:
"  Indicates its preliminary  beliefs  about which parties
would be affected by the policy;
"  Chooses  a  SO  that  will  be  responsible  for  the
reviewing report;
*  Appoints, with the  assistance and oversight of staff,
a  facilitator  who  is  personally  responsible  for
creating  the  written  consensus  policy  report  (and
can be trusted to do an unbiased job);
"  Sets  a sixty-day deadline  for submission of a report
to  the  relevant  SO  (all  stated  deadlines  to  be
modified  only  where  justified  on  the  basis  of
compelling, articulated reasons).
2.  The  report  drafter/facilitator  goes  to  work.  The  report
drafter:
"  Interviews/meets with affected parties;
"  Gathers position papers;
*  Facilitates  consensus to the extent possible;
50.  See id.
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"  Prepares  a  report  documenting  policy
recommendation  which  includes  the  extent  of
agreement  among  affected  groups,  the  outreach
process used to obtain the views of groups likely to
be affected, and the nature and intensity of reasoned
support and opposition to the proposed policy;
*  Sends  report  to  the  relevant  SO  within  the  time
limit.
3.  The SO receives the report.  The SO:
*  Has thirty days to review the report;
"  Council  must  vote  on  or  before  the  thirtieth  day
whether  to  recommend  that  the  policy  be
established;
*  Sends a report,  as revised  in  collaboration with the
facilitator,  promptly  to  the  Board,  including  any
dissenting views.
4.  The Board receives the report.  The Board:
"  Hears presentation from facilitator/drafter;
"  Has thirty days to review the report;
"  Must vote  on or before the thirtieth day whether  or
not to establish the policy;
•  May  override  dissent  if  it  is  unreasoned  or  from
unaffected groups.
5.  If a dissenter does not agree that consensus  was adequately
documented  (disputes the presence  of a consensus),  it may request
IRP review within fifteen days of the decision by the Board.
6.  If  the  IRP  sustains  the  Board's  determination  that  the
specification  or  policy  is  based  on  a  consensus  among  Internet
stakeholders  represented  in  the  ICANN  process  then  the  dissenter
must implement such specification or policy unless it promptly seeks
and obtains a stay or injunctive relief from a court or arbitrator.
*  The  report  creation  should  last no  more  than  sixty
days.  SO consideration of the report should last an
additional thirty days.  Another thirty days would be
devoted  to  Board  consideration,  plus  fifteen  days
where any decision could be appealed.  Should there
be an  appeal, the IRP  should  prepare  an opinion  in
thirty  days.  In  total  this  process  should  take  no
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more  than  165  days  (five  to  six  months),  not
including court action or arbitration.
Given the effort to be expended  by the report drafter/facilitator,
it would be  best if, in time,  this work were paid for in some neutral
fashion.  The Board should be more active in pushing the consensus
policy  process  along.  There  are  four  ways  this  could  be
accomplished:
1.  The  Board  could  call  for  work  on  a particular  consensus
policy;
2.  The Board could indicate its preliminary beliefs about which
parties would be affected by the policy;
3.  A  facilitator  could  be  appointed  who  would  be  personally
responsible  for  creating  the  written  consensus  policy  report  (and
could be trusted to do an unbiased job);
4.  Strict deadlines could be set for submission of the report to
the relevant SO.
Leadership  on  the  part  of the  Board  and  staff can  make  an
enormous  difference.  At  a  minimum,  establishing  clear  processes
can force  those  who  oppose  a proposed  policy  to  clearly  articulate
their objections.  This articulation requirement  is likely  by itself to
eliminate  a  significant  amount  of unjustifiable  opposition.  More
generally,  the  Board  and  staff can  more  clearly  express their  own
views  concerning  proposed  solutions.  So  long  as  the  ultimate
decision by the Board concerns whether a "true  consensus" has been
generated, there is no requirement for Board or staff neutrality about
the outcome.
Such  leadership  can  force  dissenting  parties  to  articulate  the
reasons  why they  oppose  a proposed  policy.  And, notably,  when
presented  with  a report  that  documents  widely held  support  for  a
proposed rule, the Board may consider, among other things, whether
the dissenter's opposition to the consensus policy is based solely on a
desire to continue to engage in unjustifiable wrongdoing.  The Board
should start by asking:
1.  Is the party raising the question substantially impacted?
2.  Is its opposition rational or reasoned?
If the answer to either question is "no," the Board may adopt the
policy  as supported by consensus despite the dissenter's  opposition.
Even if the answers to both of those initial  questions  are  "yes,"  the
Board  may  fmd  that  rational/reasoned  opposition  of an  impacted
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party may be disregarded to the extent that the opposition is based on
a desire to continue or commence  an activity that imposes substantial
unjustified  burdens  on  third  parties,  or that will  disrupt  or  prevent
emergence of an orderly, competitive marketplace.
This  "unjustifiable  opposition"  test  is  already  implicit  in  the
consensus  standard.  Many  people  have  erroneously  assumed  that
any refusal  to agree  to a new policy could prevent ICANN  action.51
To the contrary, just as ICANN can reasonably override dissent from
those  who  are not affected by  its policies  and  from those  who  will
not make  reasoned  arguments,  it may,  under  the  current  contracts,
reasonably  disregard  opposition from parties who seek  unjustifiably
to impose harm on others.
The  existing  contracts  require  the  IRP  to  exist  in  order  for
registries  and  registrars  to  be bound  by  consensus  policies.52  The
arbitration  contemplated  by  the  Blueprint  should  have  been
implemented  in a  fashion  that  preserved  the  basic  framework  for
independent  review that  is contemplated  by the  current registry  and
registrar contracts.
V.  CONCLUSION
We  believe  the  "consensus  process"  for  mandating  globally
applicable  rules  was  a  basic  premise  underlying  ICANN's
establishment.  Because  ICANN  was  not established by  the United
States,  or  any  other  government,  it  has  no  statutory  authority.
Additionally,  it  cannot  claim  to  be  a  representative  democracy.
ICANN has no power to enforce  its rules other than by means  of its
contracts  with registries  and registrars.  No  self-respecting  business
would sign up for open-ended  policy-making by ICANN's  Board of
Directors,  given the complete uncertainty such a scheme would pose
to investors.  Thus, as has been the case since the earliest days of the
Internet,  any mandatory  naming policies  need to be  supported  by  a
consensus  that  emerges  from  bottom-up  processes  involving  all
affected parties.
It  is clear  to us  that  ICANN  should  have been  restructured  to
work  towards  consensus  more  effectively.  ICANN's  goal  should
51.  See Working  Paper on the Policy-Development Process, supra note  19,
pts. 1, 1(A).
52.  See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra note 35,  § 4.3.6.
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have been to make it possible for stakeholders to decide collectively
when global, mandatory  rules are necessary  and legitimate.  Seizing
more power  to make that  decision centrally  did not serve ICANN's
core mission, as set forth in its Memorandum  of Understanding with
the Department  of Commerce, of preserving  decentralized  decision-
making.  We  fear  for  ICANN's  future  in an  increasingly  litigious
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